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NOTES AND COMMENT
Real Property- Contract of sale. Zoning Ordinance as an encum-
brance.-In most of the cities of the United States, there are so called
Zoning Ordinances, restricting the use and establishing boundaries
of resident, business and manufacturing districts. Such so called Zon-
ing Ordinances have been held constitutional in Wisconsin,' and now
exist as restrictions upon the use of the property affected thereby On
account of the recent dicta expressed in the case of Genske v Jensen
2
the expression of the court would lead one to believe that such zoning
ordinance would constitute an encumbrance within the terms of a
contract for the sale of real property, "free and clear of all encum-
brance." And it is a question whether the vendor could bring an action
for specific performance.
If the validity of the statute, or ordinance, was in doubt, equity would
not enforce specific performance because it would be necessary to
litigate the question, and the purchaser would be exposed to the chance
of litigation if he were compelled to accept title.3 In other cases involv-
ing city ordinances it has also been held that even if valid the ordinance
would be such as to restrict the use of the property and would con-
stitute an encumbrance within the legal meaning of the term.
4
It has been held that the existence of a public highway upon land
contracted to be conveyed would not be such an encumbrance as would
render the owner's title unmarketable, it being presumed that in fixing
the price of the existence of such an easement was considered by the
parties because the defect was known and visible, the same has been
held in regard to the existence of sewers, water-mains, and gas pipes
in highways because they are "incidental to the use of the land.' In
Pennsylvania the rule has been established that an ordained street,
though unopened, is an encumbrance upon property affected thereby,
and the purchaser is relieved from his agreement to purchase even
though the ordinance be repealed. 6
Upon an examination of the cases, one would be lead to believe that
the existence of a valid ordinance or law restricting the use of the
property constituted an encumbrance within the meaning of a con-
tract to "convey free and clear of all, encumbrances." The reason
being that such laws or ordinances are encumbrances within the
legal meaning of the word.
'State ex rel Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148.
2205 N.W 548 at page 549.
'Danmell v. Shaw, 166 Mass. 582, 44 N.E. 9g, Ritter v. Hill, 127 At. 455,
Graybll v. Ruhl, =5 Pa. 417, 74 AtI. 239; Bull v. Burton, 227 N.Y. Ior.
'Kittinger v. Rossinan, IZ Lel. Ch. 276, ii2 AtI. 388, Evans v. Taylor, 177 Pa.
286, 35 At. 653; Daniell %,. Shazu, supra.
Hornbeck v. Smith, 87 Or. 78, 168 Pac. 633; Fossoner v. Requa, 218 N.Y.
339, 113 N.E. 330.
6 Ritter v. Hill, 127 AtI. 455, Evans v. Taylor, and Graybill v. Ruhl, supra.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In the case of Lincoln Trust Co. v Williams Building Corporation7
an action was brought by the vendor against the vendee to procure a
judgment directing specific performance or a contract for the purchase
and sale of real property in the city of New York. In answer to the
complaint it vf'as alleged that the contract provided that the property
was to be conveyed "free and clear of all encumbrances" and that in
fact the premises were subject to an encumbrance by virtue of a
resolution of the BOARD OF ESTIMATE AND APPORTION-
MENT of the city of New York entitled, "A resolution regulating and
limiting the height and bulk of buildings, and regulating and
restricting the location of trades and industries, and the location of
buildings designed for specific uses, and establishing the boundaries of
districts for the said purposes." The defendant contended under this
allegation that they were justified in refusing to accept title. The
Appellate Division reversed the trial court and sustained the defend-
ants contention.8 Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision
was overruled, all judges concurring. In the Appellate Division, Clark
J. wrote the dissenting opinion in which he used the following language
In my opinion the buliding zone resolution is not an encumbrance within
the meaning of the contract. The resolution was obviously intended as a mere
po'llce regulation of business and premises. It is a police regulation such as the
Tenement House Law, or Building Codes and numerous other regulations, which
are never mentioned in contracts and have never been held to be encumbrances.
In the court of appeals the court followed the line of reason laid
down by the Appelate Division, in that this law was a necessary police
regulation.9 In regard to the law being an encumbrance the court
said
The resolution in question simply regulates the use of the property in districts
affected. It does not discriminate between owners. It is applicable to all alike.
Therefore the well nigh universal rule should be applied, viz, that where a person
agrees to purchase real estate, which is at the time restricted by laws or
ordinances, he will be deemed to have entered into the contract subject to the
same. He cannot thereafter be heard to object to taking the title because of such
restrictions. The contract was deliberately entered into. It is not claimed that
the defendant was mislead, deceived or improperly influenced in making it."
Even though the defendant did not know of tlhe existence of the
restriction, it is presumed that when a contract of this sort is entered
into the parties know what they are doing, and in enforcing it the
court looks to the instrument and not to the intelligence of th parties."
7 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209.
183 App. Div. 225, 169 N.Y.S. io45.
9 229 N.Y. at 317, 128 N.E. 210.
"Same.
229 N.Y. at 319 the court said, "The law always assumes that one contracts
with intelligence, and such assumption is not overcome unless proof be offered to
the contrary by an assertion of ignorance. The Courts must enforce contracts
as made. It looks to the instrument and is not usually concerned with the intelli-
gence of the parties. I am of the opinion that the resolution in question is a valid
one; that it does not constitute an encumberance upon the property which the
defendant agreed to purchase, that it should be required to specifically perform
the contract."
NOTES AND COMMENT
The court held that such resolution was not an encumbrance within the
terms of the instrument.
It is a general rule that where there is a restriction imposed by law,
a covenant restricting something that is already prohibited does not con-
stitute an encumbrance between the vendor and purchaser, because it
binds the owner no further than he could be bound by law in the
absence of a covenant,' 2 but where the restriction is greater than that
imposed by law, even though it does not prejudically affect the market
value of the premises, it has been held to be an encumorance." 3
WILLARD A. BOWMAN
Animals Owner not liable for injuries by animal in absence of
neglect or previous notice of vicious propensities.-
My Oberon! What visions have I seen!
Methought, I was enamoured of an ass.
(Midsummer-Night's Dream, Act 4, Sc. i.)
Although by lde-bound tenets of philosophy man has been postu-
lated to be "a rational animal," by a judicial construction in the state of
Wisconsin and elsewhere the former opinion is being overruled by a
slow but sure growth ad mnajorem equi gloriam. There is grave danger
that the horse will be judically noticed as the rational animal and man as
the irrational. The apotheosis of Pegasus is upon us.
In support of the premises the writer cites you Kocha v. Union
Transfer Co.,' in which it was held that the defendant was not liable
where the plaintiff, a bicyclist, had been thrown to the pavement by
reason of his bicycle having been kicked by defendant's horse (described
as of a high-strung, nervous temperament), there being no allegation
that the horse had any vicious propensities or that the defendant had
knowledge of them. Though ostensibly an exoneration of the Union
Transfer Co., the case is a glorification of the high-bred and tactful
horse-the real defendant. The learned court (which never, never
sinks to levity) proceeds
It being, therefore, -a verity in this case, that the horse possessed that which,
according to Iago, if in man or woman, "is the immediate jewel of their souls,"
"a good name," it must suffice for the horse and for us, that determining whether,
in addition to good character and reputation, he also possessed a rare discriminat-
ing taste and intelligence of head or heels when, in his pick for his kick, he chose
the insensate bicycle rather than the sensating rider, as it is claimed for him by
appealing counsel by saying, he very carefully kicked the bicycle, not the man, and
the bicycle in the very center of the handlebars, there leaving his mark, no claim
being made that he could write.
Not as an alarmist but as one sincerely interested in preserving the
status quo ante of man in the court* the writer begs to point out that
unless this defection from truth and justice be curbed in limme we will
have every J. P in the land holding court in a stall. The acceptable
reply to counsel's leading questions will be "neigh, neigh, sir." The
court bible will be hoof-marked and dog-eared instead of thumbed.
' Clsment v. Burtis, 121 N.Y. 708, 24 N.E. io3; Floyd v. Clark, 7 Abb. N.C.
136, 39 Cyc. 1500.
"Bidl v. Burton, 177 App. Div. 824, 164 N.Y.S. 824.
1 205 N. W 973 (Wis.)
